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ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL1 
by 
Peter Singer 
In recent years a number of oppressed groups have campaigned vigorously 
for equality. The classic instance is the Black Liberation movement, which 
demands an end to the prejudice and discrimination that has made blacks 
second-class citizens. The immediate appeal of the black liberation movement 
and its initial, if limited success made it a model for other oppres.5ed groups to 
follow. We became familiar. with liberation movements for Spanish-Americans, 
gay people, and a variety of other minorities. When a majority group-women­
began their campaign, some thought we had come to the end of the road. 
Discrimination on the basis of sex, it has been said, is the last universally 
accepted form of discrimination, practiced without secrecy or pretense even 
in those liberal circles that have long prided themselves on their freedom from 
prejudice against racial minorities. 
One should always be wary of talking of "the last remaining form of 
discrimination". If we have learnt anything from the liberation movements, 
we should have learnt how difficult it is to be aware of latent prejudice in our 
attitudes to particular groups until this prejudice is forcefully pointed out. 
A liberation movement demands an expansion of our moral horizons and an 
extension or reinterpretation of the basic moral principle of equality. Practices 
·that were previously regarded as natural and inevitable come to be seen as the 
result of an unjustifiable prejudice.- Who can say with confidence that all his or 
her attitudes and practices are beyond criticism? If we wish to avoid being 
numbered amongst the oppressors, we must be prepared to re-think even our 
most fundamental attitudes. We need to consider them from the point of view 
of those most disadvantaged by our attitudes, and the practices that follow from 
these attitudes. If we can make this unaccustomed mental switch we may dis· 
cover a pattern in our attitudes and practices that consistently operates so as to 
benefit one group-usually the one to which we ourselves belong-at the ex­
pense of another. In this way we may come to see that there is a case for a new 
liberation movement. My aim is to advocate that we make this mental switch in 
respect of our attitudes and practices towards a very large group of beings: mem­
bers of species other than our own-or, as we popularly though misleadingly 
call them, animals. In other words, I am urging that we extend to other species 
the basic principle of equality that most of us recognise should be extended to 
all members of our own species. 
All this may sound a little far-fetched, more like a parody of other liberation 
movements than a serious objective. In fact, in the past the idea of "The Rights 
of Animals" really has been used to parody the case for women's rights. When 
Mary Wollstonecroft, a forerunner of later feminists, published her Vindication 
of the Rights of Women in 1792, her ideas were widely regarded as absurd, and 
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they were satirized in an anonymous publication entitled A Vindication of the 
Rights of Brutes. The author of this satire (actually Thomas Taylor, a distin­
guished Cambridge philosopher) tried to refute Wollstonecroft's reasonings by 
showing that they could be carried one stage further. If sound when appJied to 
women, why should the arguments not be applied to dogs, cats and horses? 
They seemed to hold equally well for these "brutes"; yet to hold that brutes had 
rights was manifestly absurd; therefore the reasoning by which this conclusion 
had been reached must be unsound, and if unsound when applied to brutes, it 
must also be unsound when applied to women, since the very same arguments 
had been used in each case. 
One way in which we might reply to this argument is by saying that the 
case for equality between men and women cannot validly be extended to non­
human animals. Women have a right to vote, for instance, because they are 
just as capable of making rational decisions as men are; dogs, on the other hand, 
are incapable of understanding the significance of voting, so they cannot have 
the right to vote. There are many other obvious ways in whieh men and women 
resemble each other closely, while humans and other animals differ greatly. So, 
it might be said, men and women are similar beings, and should have equal 
rights, while humans and non-humans are different and should not have equal 
rights. 
The thought behind this reply to Taylor's analogy is correct up to a point, 
but it does not go far enough. There are important differences between humans 
and other animals, and these differences must give rise to some differences in the 
rights that each have. Recognizing this obvious fact, however, is no barrier to 
the case for extending the basic principle of equality to non-human animals. 
The differences that exist between men and women are equally undeniable, and 
the supporters of Women's Liberation are aware that these differences may 
give rise to different rights. Many feminists hold that women have the right to 
an abortion on request. It does not follow that sinc.-e these same people are 
campaigning for equality between men and women they must support the 
right of men to have abortions too. Since a man cannot have an abortion, it is 
meaningless to talk of his right to have one. Since a pig can't vote, it is mean­
ingless to talk of its right to vote. There is no reason why either Women's Libera­
tion or Animal Liberation should get involved in such nonsense. The extension 
of the basic principle of equality from one group to another does not imply that 
we must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or grant exactly the same 
rights to both groups. Whether we should do so will depend on the nature of 
the members of the two groups. The basic principle of equality, I shall argue, is 
equality of consideration; and equal consideration for different beings may 
lead to different treatment and different rights. 
So there is a different way of replying to Taylor's attempt to parody 
Wollstonecroft's arguments, a way which does not deny the differences between 
humans and non-humans, but goes more deeply into the question of equality, 
and concludes by finding nothing absurd in the idea that the basic principle of 
equality applies to so-called "brutes". I believe that we reach this conclusion if 
we examine the basis on which our opposition to discrimination on grounds of 
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race or sex ultimately rests. We will then see that we would be on shaky ground 
if we were to demand equality for blacks, women, and other groups of oppressed 
humans while denying equal consideration to non-humans. 
When we say that all human beings, whatever their race, creed or sex, are 
equal, what is it that we are asserting? Those who wish to defend a hierarchical, 
inegalitarian society have often pointed out that ·by whatever test we choose, it 
simply is not true that all humans are equal. Like it or not, we must face the 
fact that humans come in different shapes and sizes; they come with differing 
moral capacities, differing intellectual abilities, differing amounts of benevolent 
feeling and sensitivity to the needs of others, differing abilities to communicate 
effectively, and differing capacities to experience pleasure and pain. In short, if 
the demand for equality were based on the actual equality of all human beings, 
we would have to stop demanding equality. It would be an unjustifiable demand. 
Still, one might cling to the view that the demand for equality among human 
beings is based on the actual equality of the different races and sexes. Although 
humans differ as individuals in various ways, there are no differences between 
the races and sexes as such. From the mere fact that a person is black, or a 
woman, we cannot infer anything else about that person. This, it may be said, 
is what is wrong with racism and sexism. The white racist claims that whites 
are superior to blacks, but this is false-although there are differences between 
individuals, some blacks are superior to some whites in all of the capacities and 
abilities that could conceivably be relevant. The opponent of sexism would say 
the same: a person's sex is no guide to his or her abilities, and this is why it is 
unjustifiable to discriminate on the basis of sex. 
This is a possible line of objection to racial and sexual discrimination. It is 
not, however, the way that someone really concerned about equality would 
choose, because taking this line · could, in some circumstances, force one to 
accept a most inegalitarian society. The fact that humans differ as individuals, 
rather than as races or sexes, is a valid reply to someone who defends a hier­
archical society like, say , South Africa, in which all whites are superior in 
status to all blacks. The existence of individual variations that cut across tlhe 
lines of race or sex, however, provides us with no defence at all against a more 
sophisticated opponent of equality, one who proposes that, say, the interests of 
those with ratings above 100. Would a hierarchi cal society of this sort really be 
so much better than one based on race or sex? I think not. But if we tie the 
moral principle of equality to the factual equality of the different races or 
sexes, taken as a whole, our opposition to racism and sexism does not provide us 
with any basis for objecting to this kind of inegalitarianism. 
There is a second important reason why we ought not to base our opposition 
to racism and sexism on any kind of factual equality, even the limited kind 
asserts that variations in capacities and abilities are spread evenly between the 
different races and sexes: we can have no absolute guarantee that these abilities 
and capacities really are distributed evenly, without regard to race or sex, among 
human beings. So far as actual abilities are concerned, there do seem to be 
certain measurable differences between both races and sexes. These differences 
do not, of course, appear in each case, but only when averages are taken. More 
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important still, we do not yet know how much of these differences is really due 
to the different genetic endowments of the various races and sexes, and how 
much is due to environmental differences that are the result of past and 
continuing discrimination. Perhaps all of the important differences will even­
tually prove to be environmental rather t!han genetic. Anyone opposed to 
racism and sexism will certainly hope that this will be so, for it will make the 
task of ending discrimination a lot easier; nevertheless it would be dangerous to 
rest the case against racism and sexism on the belief that all significant d.iffer­
ences are environmental in origin. The opponent of, say, racism who takes this 
line will !be unable to avoid conceding that if differences in ability did after all 
prove to have some genetic connection with race, racism would in some way be 
defensible. 
It would be folly for the opponent of racism to stake his whole case on a 
dogmatic commitment to one particular outcome of a difficult scientific issue 
which is still a long way from being settled. While attempts to prove that 
differences in certain selected abilities betwreen races and sexes are primarily 
genetic in origin have certainly not been conclusive, the same must be said 
of attempts to prove that these differences are largely the result of environment.' 
At this stage of the investigation we cannot be ·c ertain which view is correct, 
however much we may hope it is the latter. 
Fortunately, there is no need to pin the case for equality to one particular 
outcome of this scientific investigation. The appropriate response to those who 
claim to have found evidence of genetically-based differences in ability between 
the races or sexes is not to stick to the belief that the genetic explanation must be 
wrong, whatever evidence to the contrary may turn up: instead we should make 
it quite clear that the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral 
capacity., physical strength, or similar matters of fact. Equality is a moral ideal, 
not a simple assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for 
assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any 
difference in the amount of consideration we give to satisfying their needs and 
interests. The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an 
alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should 
treat humans. 
Jeremy Bentham incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his 
utilitarian system of ethics in the formula: "Each to count for one and none for 
more than one." In other words, the interests of every being affected by an 
action are to be taken into accouht and given the same weight as the like 
interests of any other being. A later utilitarian, Henry Sidgwick, put the point 
in this way: "The good of any one individual is of. no mote importance, from the 
point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other."2 
More recently, the leading figures in contemporary moral philosophy have 
shown a great deal of agreement in specifying as a fundamental presupposition 
of their moral theories some similar requirement which operates so as to give 
everyone's interests equal consideration-although they cannot agree on how 
this requirement is best formulated. 3 
It is an implication of this principle of equality that our concern for others 
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ought not lo depend on what they are like, or what abilities they possess-al­
though precisely what this concern requires us to do may vary according to the 
characteristics of those affected by what we do. It is on this basis that the case 
against racism and the case against sexism must both ultimately rest; and it is in 
accordance with this principle that speciesism is also to be condemned. If 
possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use 
another for his own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit non-humans? 
Many philosophers have proposed the principle of equal consideration of 
inleresls, in some form or other, as a basic moral principle; bul, as we shall see in 
more detail shortly, not many of them have recognised that this principle applies 
to members of other species as well as to our own. Bentham was one of the few 
who did realize this. In a forward-looking passage, written at a time when black 
slaves in the British dominions were still being treated much as we now treat 
non-human animals, Bentham wrote: 
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those 
rights which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of 
tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin 
is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to 
the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognised that the 
number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os 
sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to 
the same fate. What else is it that should trnce the insuperable line? Is it the 
faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown 
horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more con­
versable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But 
suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can 
they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?7 
In this passage Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as the vital 
characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration. The capacity 
for suffering-or more strictly, for suffering and/or enjoyment or happiness-is 
not just another characteristic like the capacity for language, or for higher 
mathematics. Bentham is not saying that those who try to mark "the insuperable 
line" that determines whether the interests of a being should be considered 
happen to have selected the wrong characteristic. The capacity for suffering and 
enjoying things is a pre-requisite for having interests at all, a condition that 
must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way. It 
would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked 
along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it can­
not suffer. Nothing that we can do to il could possibly make any difference fo 
its welfare. A mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being 
tormented, because it will suffer if it is. 
If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take 
that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the 
principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the 
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like suff:ering-in so far as rough comparisons can be made-of any other being. 
If a being is not capable of suffering, or of ex.periencing enjoyment or happiness, 
there is nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of sentience 
(using the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand for the 
capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness) is the only defensible 
boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark this boundary by some 
characteristic like intemgence or rationality would be to mark it in an arbitrary 
way. Why not choose some other characteristic, like skin color? 
The racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the 
interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their 
interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly the speciesist 
allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of 
members of other species.5 The pattern is the same in each case. Most human 
beings are speciesists. I shall now veey briefly describe some of the practices that 
show this. 
For the great majority of human beings, especially in urban, industrialized 
sociebes, the most direct form of contact with members of other species is at 
meal-times: we eat them. In doing so we treat them purely as means to our ends. 
We regard their life and well-being as subordinate to our taste for a part.icular 
kind of dish. I say "taste" deliberately-this is purely a matter of pleasing our 
palate. There can be no defence of eating flesh in terms of satisfying nutri­
tional needs, since it has been established beyond doubt that we couhi satisfy 
our need for protein and other essential nutrients far more efficiently with a 
diet that replaced animal flesh by soy beans, or products derived from soy 
beans, and other high·protein vegetable products. 6 
It is not merely the act of killing that indicates what we are ready to do to 
other species in order to gratify our tastes. The suffering we inflict o n  the 
animals while they are alive is perhaps an even clearer indication of our species. 
ism than the fact that we are prepared to kill them. 7 In order to have meat on 
the table at a price that people can afford , our society tolerates methods of meat 
production that confine sentient animals in cramped, unsuitable conditions for 
the entire durations of their lives. Animals are treated like machines that con­
vert fodder into flesh, and any innovation that results in a higher "conversion 
ratio" is liable to be adopted. As one authority on the subject has said, "cruelty 
is acknowledged only when profitability ceases".s So hens are crowded four or 
five to a cage with a floor area of twenty inches by eighteen inches, or around 
the size · of a single page of the New York Times. The cages have wire floors, 
since this reduces cleaning costs, though wire is unsuitable for the hens' feet; 
the floors slope, since this makes the eggs roll down for easy collection, although 
this makes it difficult for the hens to rest comfortably. ln these conditions al1 
the birds' natural instincts are th warted : they cannot stretch their w•ngs fully, 
walk freely, dust-bathe, scratch the ground, or build a nest. Although they have 
never known other conditions, observers have noticed that the birds vainly try 
to perform these actions. Frustrated at I.heir inability to do so, they often 
develop what farmers call "vic;es", and peck each other to death. To pr.event 
this, the beaks of young birds are often cut off. 
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This kind of treatment is not limited to poultry. Pigs are now also being 
reared in cages inside sheds. These animals are comparable to dogs in intelligence, 
and need a varied, stimulating environment if they are not to suffer from stress 
and boredom. Anyone who kept a dog in the way in which pigs are frequently 
kept would be liable to prosecution, in England at least, but because our interest 
in exploiting pigs is greater than our interest in exploiting dogs, we object to 
cruelty to dogs while consuming the produce of cruelty to pigs. Of the other 
animals, the condition of veal calves is perhaps worst of all, since these animals 
are so closely confined that they cannot even turn around or get up and lie down 
fteely. In this way they do not develop unpalatable muscle. They are also made 
anaemic and kept short of roughage, to keep their flesh pale, since white veal 
fetches a higher price; as a result they develop a craving for iron and roughage, 
and have been observed to gnaw wood off the sides of their stalls, and Ii.ck 
greedily at any rusty hinge that is within reac!h. 
Since, as I have said, none of these practices cater for anything more than 
'our pleasures of taste, our practice of rearing and killing other animals in order 
to eat them is a clear instance of the sacrifice of the most important interests 
of other beings in order to satisfy trivial interests of our own. To avoid 
speciesism we must stop this practice, and each of us has a moral obligation to 
cease supporting the practice. Our custom is all the support that the meat­
industry needs. The decision to cease giving it that support may be difficult, 
but it is no more difficult than it would have been for a white Southerner to go 
against the traditions of his society and free his slaves; if we do not change our 
dietary habits, how can we censure those slaveholders who would not change 
their own way of living? 
The same form of discriminatipn may be observed in the widespread practice 
of experimenting on othe·r species in order to see if certain substances are safe 
. for human beings, or to test some psychological theory about the effect of 
severe punishment on learning, or to try out various new compounds just in 
case something turns up. People sometimes think that all this experimentation is 
for vital medical purposes, and so will reduce suffering overall. This comfortable 
belief is very wide of the mark. Drug companies test new shampoos and cos­
metics that they are intending to put on the market by dropping them into the 
eyes of rabbits, held open by metal clips, in order to observe what damage 
results. Food additives, like artificial colorings and preservatives, are tested by 
what is known as the "LD50"-a test designed to find the level of consumption 
at which 50% of a group of animals will die. In the process, nearly all of the 
animals are made very sick before some finally die, and others pull through. If 
the substance is relatively !harmless, as it often is, huge doses have to be force-fed 
to the animals, until in some cases sheer volume or concentration of the 
substance causes death. 
Mwch of this pointless cruelty goes on in the universities. In many areas of 
science, non-human animals are regarded as an item of laboratory equipment, to 
be used and expended as desired. In psychology laboratories experimenters 
devise endless variations and repetitions of experiments that were of little value 
in the first place. To quote just one example, frpm the experimenter's own 
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account in a psychology journal: at the University of Pennsylvania, Pernn S. 
Cohen hung six dogs in hammocks with electrodes taped to their hind feet. 
Electric shock of varying intensity was then administered through the electrodes. 
If the dog learnt to press its head against a panel on the left, the shock was 
turned off, but otherwise it  remained on indefinitely. Three of the dogs, 
however, were required to wait periods varying from 2 to 7 seconds while being 
shocked before makin,g the response that turned off the current. If they failed 
to wait, they received further shocks. Each dog was given from 26 to 46 
"sessions" in the hammock, each session consisting of 80 "trials" or shocks, 
administered at intervals of one minute. The experimenter reported that the 
dogs, who were unable to move in the hammock, barked or bobbed their 
heads when the current was applied. The reported findings of the experiment 
were that there was a delay in the dogs' responses that increased proportionately 
to the time the dogs were required to endure the shock, but a gradual increase 
in the intensity of the shock had no systematic effect in the timing of the 
response. The experiment was funded by the National Institutes of Health, 
and the United States Public Health Service. 9 
In this example, and countless cases like it, the possible benefits to mankind 
are either non-existent or fantastically remote; while the certain losses to 
members of other species are very real. This is, again, a clear indication of 
speciesism. 
In the past, argument about vivesection has oft�n missed this point, because 
it has been put in absolutist terms: would the abolitionist be prepared to let 
thousands die if they could be saved by experimenting on a single animal? The 
way to reply to this purely hypothetical question is to pose another: would the 
experimenter be prepared to perform his experiment on an orphaned human 
infant, if that were the only way to save many lives? (I say "orphan" to avoid 
the complication of parental feelings, although in doing so I am being overfair 
to the experimenter, since the nonhuman subjects of experiments are not 
orphans.) If the experimenter is not prepared to use an orphaned human infant, 
then his readiness to use nonhumans is simple discrimination, since adult apes, 
cats, mice and other mammals are more aware of what is happening to them, 
more self-directing and!, so far as we can tell, at least as sensitive to pain, as any 
human infant. There seems to be no relevant characteristic that human infants 
possess that adult mammals do not have to the same or a higher degree. (Some­
one might try to argue that what makes it wrong to experiment on a human 
infant is that the infant will, in time and if left alone, develop into more than the 
nonhuman, but one would then, to be consistent, have to oppose abortion, 
since the fetus has the same potential as the infant-indeed!, even contraception 
and abstinence might be wrong on this ground, since the egg and sperm, 
considered jointly, also have the same potential . In any case, this argument still 
gives us no reason for selecting a nonhuman, rather than a hurnan with severe 
and irreversible brain damage, as the subject for our experiments.) 
The experimenter, then, shows a bias in favor of his own species whenever he 
carries out an experiment on a nonhuman for a purpose that he would not 
think justified him in using a human being at an equal or lower level of 
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.sentience, awareness, ability to be self-directing, etc. No one familiar with the 
kind of results yielded by most ex�ments on animals can have the slightest 
doubt that if this bias were eliminated the number of experiments performed 
would be a minute fraction of the number performed today. 
Experimenting on animals, and eating their flesh, are perhaps the two major 
forms of speciesism in our society. By comparison, the third and last form of 
speciesism is so minor as to be insignificant, but it is perhaps of some special 
interest to those for whom this paper was written. I am referring to speciesism 
in contemporary philosophy. 
Philosophy ought to question the basic assumptions of the age. Thinking 
through, critically and carefully, what most people take for granted is, I 
jbelieve, the chief task of philo�ophy, and it is this task that makes philosophy 
a worthwhile activity. Regrettably, philosophy does not always live up to its 
historic role. Philosophers arei human beings and they are subject to all the pre­
conceptions of the society to which they belong. Sometimes they succeed in 
,breaking free of the prevailing ideology: more often they become its most 
'sophisticated defenders. So, in this case, philosophy as practiced in the 
·universities today does not challenge anyone's preconceptions about our 
relations with other species. By their writings, those philosophers who tackle 
problems that touch upon the issue reveal that they make the same unquestioned 
assumptions as most other humans, and what they say tends to confirm the 
reader in his or her comfortable speciesist habits. 
I could illustrate this claim by referring to the writings of philosophers in 
various fields-for instance, the attempts that have been made by those interested 
in rights to draw the boundary of the sphere of rights so that it runs parallel to 
the biological boundaries of the species homo sapiens, including infants and even 
mental defectives, but excluding those other beings of equal or greater capacity 
who are so useful to us at mealtimes and in our laboratories. I think it would be 
a more appropriate conclusion to this paper, however, if I concentrated on the 
problem with which we have been centrally concerned, the t>roblem of equality. 
It is significant that the problem of equality, in moral and political philos­
ophy, is invariably formulated in terms of human equality. The effect of this 
is that the question of the equality of other animals does not confront the 
philosopher, or student, as an issue in itself-and this is already an indication of 
·the failure of philosophy to challenge accepted beliefs. Still, philosophers have 
found it difficult to discuss the issue of human equality without raising, in a 
paragraph or two, the question of the status of other animals. The reason for 
this, which should be apparent from what l have said already, is that if humans 
·are to be regarded as equal to one another, we need some sense of "equal" that 
1does not require any actual, descriptive equality of capacities, talents or other 
·qualities. If equality is to be related to any actual characteristics of humans, 
these characteristics must be some lowest common denominator, pitched so low 
that no human lacks them-but then the philosopher comes up against the catch 
that any such set of characteristics which covers all humans will not be 
possessed only by humans. In other words, it turns out that in the only sense in 
which we can truly say, as an assertion of fact, that all humans are equal, at 
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least some members of other species are also equal-equal, that is, to each other 
and to humans. If, on the other hand, we regard the statement "All humans are 
equal" in some non-factual way, perhaps as a prescription, then, as I have 
already argued, it is even more difficult to exclude non-humans from the sphere 
of equality. 
This result is not what the egalitarian philosopher originally intended to 
assert. Instead of accepting the radical outcome to which their own reasonings 
naturally point, however, most philosophers try to reconcile their beliefs in 
human equality and animal inequality by arguments that can only be described 
as devious. 
As a first example, I take William Frankena's well-known article "The 
Concept of Social Justice. "1 o Frankena opposes the idea of basing justice on 
merit, because he sees that this could lead to highly inegalitarian results. Instead 
he proposes the principle that: 
. . . all men are to be treated as equals, not because they are equal, in 
any respect but simply because they are human. They are human because they 
have emotions and desires, and are able to think, and hence are capable of 
enjoying a good life in a sense in which other animals are not. 
But what is this capacity to enjoy the good life which all humans have, but 
no other animals? Other animals have emotions and desires, and appear to be 
capable of enjoying a good life. We may doubt that they ca·n think-although 
the behavior of some apes, dolphins and even dogs suggests, that some of them 
can-but what is the relevance of thinking? Frankena goes on to admit that by 
"the good life" he means "not so much the morally good life as the happy or 
satisfactory life'', so thought would appear to be unnecessary for enjoying the 
good life; in fact to emphasise the need for thought would make difficulties for 
the egalitarian since only some people are capable of leading intellectually 
satisfying lives, or morally good lives. This makes it difficult to see what 
Frankena's principle of equality has to do with simply being human. Surely 
every sentient being is capable of leading a life that is happier or less miserable 
than some alternative life, and hence has a claim to be taken into account. In this 
respect the distinction !between humans and non-humans is not a sharp division, 
but rather a continuum along which we move gradually, and with overl(lps 
between the species, from simple capacities for enjoyment and satisfaction, or 
pain and suffering, to more complex ones. 
Faced with a situation in which they see a need for some basis for the moral 
gulf that is commonly thought to separate humans and animals, but can find 
no concrete difference that will do the job without undermining the equality 
of humans philosophers tend to waffle. They resort to high-sounding phrases 
like "the i�trinsic dignity of the human individual";11 They talk of the "intrin­
sic worth of all men" as if men (humans?) had some worth that other beings 
did not 1 2  or they say that humans, and only humans1 are "ends in themselves'', , 
l h l f " 1 3 while "everything other than a person can on y ave va ue or a person . 
This idea of a distinctive human dignity and worth has a long history; it can 
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be traced back directly to the Renaissance humanists, for instance to Pico 
della Mirandola's Oration on the Dignity of Man. Pico and other humanists 
based their estimate of human dignity on the idea that man possessed the 
central, pivotal position in the "Great Chain of Being" that led from the low· 
liest forms of matter to God himself; this view of the universe, in turn, goes 
back to both classical and Judeo-Christian doctrines. Contemporary philosophers 
have cast off these metaphysical and religious shackles and freely invoke the 
dignity of mankind without needing to justify the idea at all. Why should we not 
attribute "intrinsic dignity,, or "intrinsic worth ,, to ourselves? Fellow-humans 
are unlikely to reject the accolades we so generously bestow on them, and those 
to whom we deny the honor are unable to object. Indeed, when one thinks only 
of humans, it can be very liberal, very progressive, to talk of the dignity of all 
human beings. In so doing, we implicitly condemn slavery, racism, and other 
violations of human rights. We admit that we ourselves are in some fundamental 
sense on a par with the poorest, most ignorant members of our own species. It 
is only when we think of humans as no more than a small sub-group of all the 
beings that inhabit our planet that we may realize that in elevating our own 
species we are at the same time lowering the relative status of all other species. 
The truth is that the appeal to the intrinsic dignity of human beings appears 
to solve the egalitarian's problems only as long as it goes unchallenged. Once we 
ask why it should be that all humans-jncluding infants, mental defectives, 
psychopaths, Hitler, Stalin and the rest-have some kind of dignity or worth 
that no elephant, pig or chimpanzee can ever achieve, we see that this question 
is as difficult to answer as our original request for some relevant fact that 
justifies the inequality of humans and other animals. In fact, these two questions 
are really one: talk of intrinsic dignity or moral worth only takes the problem 
back one step, because any satisnctory defence of the claim that all and only 
humans have intrinsic dignity would need to refer to some relevant capacities or 
characteristics that all and only humans possess. Philosophers frequently intro­
duce ideas of dignity, respect and worth at the point at which other reasons 
appear to be lacking, but this is hardly good enough. Fine phrases are the last 
resource of those who have run out of arguments. 
In case there are those who still think it may be possible to find some 
relevant characteristic that distinguishes all humans from all members of other 
species, I shall refer again, before I conclude, to the existence of some humans 
who quite clearly are below the level of awareness, self -consciousness, intelli­
gence, and sentience, of many non-humans. I am thinking of humans with 
severe and irreparable brain damage, and also of infant humans. To avoid the 
complication of the relevance of a being's potential, however, I shall henceforth 
concentrate on permanently retarded humans. 
l?hilosophers who set out to find a characteristic that will distinguish humans 
from other animals rarely take the course of abandoning these groups of humans 
by lumping them in with the other animals. It is easy to see why they do not. 
To talce this line without re-thinking our attitudes to other animals would entail 
that we have the right to perform painful experiments on retarded humans for 
trivial reasons; similarly it would follow that we had the right to rear and kill 
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these humans for food. To most philosophers these consequences are as un· 
acceptable as the view that we should stop treating non-humans in this way. 
Of course, when discussing the problem of equality it is possible to ignore 
the problem of mental defectives, or brush it aside as if somehow insignificant.14 
This is the easiest way out. What else remains? My final example of speciesism in 
contemporary philosophy has been selected to show what happens when a 
writer is prepared to face the question of human equality and animal in· 
equality without ignoring the existence of mental defectives, and without 
resorting to obscurantist mumbo-jumbo. Stanley Benn's cnear and honest article 
"Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of Interests"l 5 fits this description. 
Benn after noting the usual "evident human inequalities" argues, correctly I 
think, fo
1
r equality of consideration as the only po'ssible basis for egalitarianism. 
Yet Benn, like other writers, is thinking only of "equal consideration of human 
interests". Benn is quite open in his defence of this restriction of equal consid­
eration: 
. . .  not to possess human shape is a disqualifying condition. However faithful 
or intelligent a dog may be, it would be a monstrous sentimentality to 
attribute to him interests that could be weighed in an equal balance with 
those of human beings . . .  if, for instance, one had to decide between feeding 
a hungry baby or a hungry dog, anyone who chose the dog would generally 
be reckoned morally defective, unable to recognize a fundamental in­
equality of claims. 
This is what distinguishes our attitude to animals from our attitude to 
imbeciles. It would be odd to say that we ought to respect equally the 
dignity or pe�onality of the imbecile and of the rational man . . .  but there 
is nothing odd about saying that we should respect their interests equally, 
that is, that we should give to the interests of each the same serious consider­
ation as claims to considerations necessary for some standard of weU-being 
that we can recognize and endorse. 
Benn's statement of the basis of the consideration we should have for 
imbeciles seems to me correct, but why should there be any fundamental 
inequality of claims between a dog and a human imbecile? Benn sees that if 
equal consideration depended on rationality, no rea5on could be given against 
using imbeciles for research purposes, as we now use dogs and guinea pigs. 
This will not do: "But of course we do distinguish imbeciles from animals in 
this regard", he says. That the common distinction is justifiable is something 
Benn does not question; his problem is how it is to be justified. The answer he 
gives is this: 
. . .  we respect the interests of men and give them priority over dogs not 
insofar as they are rational, but because rationality is the human norm. We 
say it is unfair to exploit the deficiencies of the imbecile who falls short of 
the norm, just as it would be unfair, and not just ordinarily dishonest, to 
steal from a blind man. If we do not think in this way about dogs, it is 
because we do not see the irrationality of the dog as a deficiency or a: 
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handicap, but as normal for the species. The characteristics, therefore, that 
distinguish the normal man from the normal dog make it intelligible for us 
to talk of other men having interests and capacities, and therefore claims, of 
precisely the same kind as we make on our own behalf. But although these 
characteristics may provide the point of the distinction between men and 
other species, they are not in fact the qualifying conditions for membership, 
or the distinguishing criteria of the class of morally considerable persons; and 
this is precisely because a man does not become a member of a different 
species, with its own standards of normality, by reason of not possessing 
these characteristics. 
The final sentence of this passage gives the argument away. An imbecile, 
Benn concedes, tnay have no characteristics superior to those of a dog; never· 
theless this does not make the imbecile a member of "a different species" as 
the dog is. Therefore it would be "unfair" to use the imbecile for medical 
research as we use the dog. But why? That the imbecile is not rational is just 
the way things have worked out, and the same is true of the dog-neither is any 
more responsible for their mental level. If it is unfair to take advantage of an 
isolated defect, why is it fair to take advantage of a more general limitation? I 
find it hard to see anything in this argument except a defence of preferring the 
interests of members of our own species because they are members of our own 
species. To those who think there might be more to it, I suggest the following 
mental exercise. Assume that it has been proven that there is a difference in 
the average, or normal, intelligence quotient for two different races, say whites 
and blacks. Then substitute· the term "white" for every occurrence of "men" 
and "black" for every occurrence of "dog" in the passage quoted; and sub­
stitute "high I.Q." for ''rationality" and when Benn talks of "imbeciles" re­
place this term by "dumb whites"-that is, whites who fall well below the 
normal white I.Q. score. Finally, change "species" to "race". Now re-read the 
passage. It has become a defence of a rigid, no-exceptions division between 
whites and blacks, based on I.Q. scores, not withstanding an admitted over­
lap between whites and blacks in this respect. The revised passage is, of course, 
outrageous, and this is not only because we have made fictitious assumptions in 
our substitutions. The point is that in the original passage Benn was defending a 
rigid division in the amount of consideration due to members of different 
species, despite admitted cases of overlap. If the original did not, at first reading 
strike us as being as outrageous as the revised version does, this is largely because 
although we are not racists ourselves, most of us are speciesists. Like the other 
articles, Benn's stands as a warning- of the P.ase with which the best minds can 
!aU victim to a prevailing ideology. 
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lo'OOTNOTES 
1Passages of this article appeared in a review of Animals, Men and Morals, edited by 
S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (Go!Jancz and Taplinger, Lond!on 1972) in The New 
Yorh Reuiew of Books, April 5, 1973. The whole direction of my thinking on this subject I 
owe to talks with a number of friends In Oxford in 1970-71. especially Richard Keshen, �tanley Godlovitch, and, above alJ, R.oslind Godlovitch. 
The Methods of Ethics (7th Ed.) P. 382. 
JFor example. R. M. Hare. Freedom and Reason (Oxford, 1963) and J. Rawls. A Theory of 
Ju1tice (Harvard, 1972); for a brief account of the essential aereement on this issue 
between these and other positions, see R. M. Hare, "Rules ot War and Moral Reasoning," 
Philoi;ophy and Public Affairs, vol. I. no. 2 (1972). 4rntroduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. XVII. 
51 owe the term "speciesism" to Dr. Richard Ryder. 
6xn order to produce 1 lb. of protein in the roim of beef or veal, we must feed 21 lbs. of 
protein to the animal. Qt.her fonns of livestock are slightly less inefficient, but the average 
ratio in the U. s. is still 1 :8. H has been estimated that the amount of protein lost to 
humans in this way is equivalent to 90% of the annual world protein deficit. For a brief 
account, see Frances Moote Lappe, Diet for a Small Planet (Friends of The Earth/ 'a!Jantine, New York 1971) PP. 4·11. 
Althoullth one might think that killlna: a being is olbviously the ultimate wrona: one can do 
to it, I think that the infliction of suffering is a cleazer indication of speciesism because it 
might be argued that at least part of what is wrong with killing a human is that most 
humans are conscious of their existence over time, and have desires and purposes that ex· 
tend Into the future-see, for instance, M. Tooley. "Abortion and Infanticide". Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, vol. 2, no. 1 (1972). Of course, If one took this view one would have to 
hold-as Tooley does-that killina: a human infant or mental defective is not in itself wrong, 
and is less serious than killing certain higher mammals that probably do have a sense of 
N!eir own existence over time. 
Ruth Harrison, Animal Machines (Stuart, London, 1964). This book provides an eye-8penin1 account of intensive farming methods for those unfamiliar with the subject. 
Journal of the Experime·ntal Analysi6 of Behavior, vol. 18, no. 1 (1970). Any recent 
volume of this journal, or of other journals in the field, like the Journal of Comparative and 
Phy1iological Psychology, w ill contain reports of equally cruel and trivial experiments. For 
a fuller account. see Richard Ryder, "Experiments on Animals" in Anlmal1, Men and 
M_pral1. 
101n R. Brandt (ed.) Social Justice (Prentice Hall, En&Iewoou C!Hfs, 1962); the passage �uoted appears on P. 19. 
1 Frankena, op. cit., p. 23. 
12H . A. Bedau, "Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality" in Nomos IX: Equalit)', ed. 
J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman, New York 1967. 
l 3G. Vlastos. "Justice and Equality" in Brandt, Social Ju.<tice, p. 48. 14E. g. Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality", in Philosoph)', Politics and Society 
(second series) ed. P. Laslett and W. Runciman (BlaekwelJ, Oxford, 1962) p. 118; J. Rawls. 
A Theory of Justice, p, pp. 609-10. 
1°Nomo6 IX: EQuality; the passages quoted are on pp. 62ff. 
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